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OPINION OF THE COURT 




ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 This appeal arises from the Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceedings of Modular Structures, Inc. ("Modular").  Prior to 
filing for bankruptcy on March 8, 1991, Modular had contracted to 
construct a new corporate headquarters in Newark, New Jersey, for 
the Salvation Army.  First Indemnity of America Insurance Company 
("First Indemnity") issued a bond to the Salvation Army to secure 
Modular's performance and payment obligations under the contract. 
Eleven months after the institution of the bankruptcy 
proceedings, First Fidelity Bank ("the Bank"), as a secured 
creditor of Modular, filed a Notice of Motion for Turnover of 
Funds to obtain the unearned contract proceeds and retainage held 
by the Salvation Army.  First Indemnity filed a cross-motion to 
3 
place the contract proceeds and retainage in escrow in order to 
assure that the funds remained available to secure Modular's 
obligations to pay subcontractors.  On March 2, 1992, the 
bankruptcy court denied First Indemnity's cross-motion and 
entered an Order Allowing Turnover in favor of the Bank.  First 
Indemnity appealed this decision to the district court which 
affirmed the bankruptcy court.   
 Because we conclude that the district court and the 
bankruptcy court incorrectly determined that the contract 
proceeds and retainage, which the Salvation Army was holding, 
were part of the estate in bankruptcy, we will reverse the order 
directing turnover to the Bank.  We also conclude that the 
bankruptcy court made an insufficient examination of whether 
Modular had any legal or equitable interest in the funds held by 
the Salvation Army.  We will therefore remand this issue to the 
bankruptcy court for further proceedings in this regard. 
I. 
 On February 27, 1989, Modular entered into a contract 
with the Salvation Army for the design and construction of a new 
corporate headquarters in Newark, New Jersey.  In accordance with 
the terms of the contract, First Indemnity, as surety, issued its 
Labor and Material Payment Bond and its Performance Bond to the 
Salvation Army, as obligee, to secure Modular's performance of 
the contract.  The bonds bound Modular and First Indemnity to pay 
4 
Modular's laborers and materialmen in connection with the 
contract, which was incorporated by reference into the bonds.1 
 In March 1989, the Bank loaned Modular the principal 
sum of $1.5 Million to enable Modular to undertake construction 
contracts such as the one with the Salvation Army.  The Bank 
entered into a General Security Agreement whereby it took a 
security interest in all of Modular's accounts receivable, 
contracts and proceeds thereof.  Modular also executed a Uniform 
Commercial Code Financing Statement which was filed on April 20, 
1989, thereby perfecting the Bank's lien. 
  Modular commenced work on the Salvation Army project 
but was unable to complete all of its obligations under the 
contract.  On March 8, 1991, Modular filed for protection under 
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, and a Trustee was 
                                                           
1The surety on a construction surety bond guarantees to the owner 
that the contractor will finish the job.  If the contractor 
defaults, the surety performs the work, mitigates loss by its 
performance, and pays the subcontractors and suppliers.  In 
performing this function, the surety "stands in the shoes" of 
other parties to the construction project through use of the 
equitable doctrine of subrogation: 
 
[T]he surety in cases like this undertakes 
duties which entitle it to step into three 
sets of shoes.  When, on default of the 
contractor, it pays all the bills of the job 
to date and completes the job, it stands in 
the shoes of the contractor insofar as there 
are receivables due it; in the shoes of 
laborers and materialmen who have been paid 
by the surety -- who may have had liens; and 
not least, in the shoes of the government 
[owner], for whom the job was completed. 
 
National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 
411 F.2d 843, 847-49 (1st Cir. 1969). 
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appointed.  Modular stated in its bankruptcy schedules that the 
Bank maintained a first, perfected security interest in Modular's 
accounts receivable and contracts and proceeds thereof.  On 
August 5, 1991, the Bank obtained a consent order from the 
Trustee granting it a "Superpriority Lien" in Modular's account 
receivables.  Following the consent order, the Bank pursued 
collection of Modular's accounts receivable.   
 First Indemnity contends that the unpaid contract 
proceeds and retainage held by the Salvation Army were not 
properly characterized as accounts receivable owing to Modular so 
that the Bank's superpriority lien would apply to them.  Pursuant 
to Article 6 of the contract between Modular and the Salvation 
Army, the Salvation Army was not obligated to make final payment 
to Modular until:  "(1) the Contract has been fully performed by 
the contractor except for the Contractor's responsibility to 
correct nonconforming work as provided in Subparagraph 12.2.2 of 
the General Conditions and to satisfy other requirements, if any, 
which necessarily survive final payment; and (2) a final 
Certificate for Payment has been issued by the architect . . .." 
App. at 79a.  Article 9, section 1.2, of the Contract defined the 
"General Conditions" as the General Conditions of the contract 
for Construction, AIA Document A201, 1987 Edition.  Those General 
Conditions included Article 3, section 4.1, which stated that the 
Contractor shall provide and pay for the labor, materials and 
equipment necessary for the proper completion of the work, as 
well as Article 9, section 3.1.2, which provided that a 
Contractor's application for payment "may not include requests 
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for payments of amounts the Contractor does not intend to pay to 
a Subcontractor or material supplier because of a dispute or 
other reason."  App. at 96a, 104a.  Article 9, section 5.1.3, 
permitted the Architect to withhold his certification for payment 
to the extent necessary to protect the Owner from loss as the 
result of the failure of the Contractor to make payments properly 
to Subcontractors or for labor, materials or equipment.  See app. 
at 105a.   
 Additionally, Article 9, section 10.2, provided that: 
Neither final payment nor any remaining 
retained percentage shall become due until 
the Contractor submits to the Architect (1) 
an affidavit that payrolls, bills for 
materials and equipment, and other 
indebtedness connected with the Work for 
which the Owner or the Owner's property might 
be responsible or encumbered (less amounts 
withheld by Owner) have been paid or 
otherwise satisfied, . . . (4) consent of 
surety, if any, to final payment and (5) if 
required by the Owner, other data 
establishing payment or satisfactions of 
obligations, such as receipts, releases and 
waivers of liens, claims, security interests 
or encumbrances arising out of the Contract 
to the extent and in such form as may be 
designated by the Owner . . .. 
App. at 106a.  Finally, Article 14, section 2.1.2, provided that 
the owner might terminate the contract if the contractor "fails 
to make payment to Subcontractors for materials or labor in 
accordance with the respective agreements between the Contractor 
and the Subcontractors."  Article 14, section 2.2, further 
provided that upon such a termination, "the Contractor shall not 
be entitled to receive further payment until the Work is 
finished."  See app. at 111a-112a.  In sum, Modular was obligated 
7 
to pay its subcontractors before it could receive final payment 
from the Salvation Army.   
 It is undisputed that First Indemnity, as surety for 
Modular, has been called upon to pay proper claims of 
subcontractors.  First Indemnity, therefore, sent a letter, dated 
April 2, 1991, to the Salvation Army explaining that it should 
issue no additional payments to Modular so that any remaining 
funds could properly be used to cure Modular's default.  The 
Bank, on the other hand, contends that, despite Modular's 
apparent breach of its contract with the Salvation Army, a letter 
sent by Charles R. Kramer, Jr., Esq., counsel for the Salvation 
Army, to counsel for the Bank demonstrates that the Salvation 
Army considered the contract terms to have been satisfied.  The 
letter stated, inter alia, that "The Army is prepared to pay the 
final installment of $104,490.00, but wishes to do so only if 
said payment will not expose The Army to duplicate payments." 
App. at 114r.  First Indemnity interprets this letter as 
requiring that the funds held by the Salvation Army not be 
payable to Modular until and unless Modular fully performed its 
contract, including the payment of laborers and materialmen.2   
                                                           
2We note that neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court 
cited this letter in its decision on the turnover order. Our 
reading of the clear language of the letter, in view of the 
contract language discussed above, leads us to conclude that, in 
view of the unpaid subcontractors, the Salvation Army would have 
been exposed to "duplicate payments" if it had released the funds 
to Modular.  For that reason, we conclude that contract terms had 
not been satisfied and the Salvation Army was not obligated to 
release the funds to Modular. 
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 On November 7, 1991, counsel for the Bank sent a letter 
to the Salvation Army threatening to institute legal action if 
the Salvation Army did not release the funds to the Bank by 
November 22, 1991.  The Salvation Army did not comply and the 
Bank filed its motion for turnover of the funds in Modular's 
bankruptcy proceeding. 
 The bankruptcy court found for the Bank on the basis 
that the contract was not a public contract and therefore there 
was no trust fund to protect the funds, and it issued an Order 
for Turnover of the funds.  App. at 241r.  First Indemnity then 
appealed to the district court which affirmed the decision of the 
bankruptcy court.  The district court considered whether under 
New Jersey law the funds should be construed to be held in trust 
for subcontractors and thus entitled to special priority in a 
bankruptcy proceeding.  The district court concluded that no 
constructive trust for subcontractors was created by New Jersey 
common law and affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court. 
App. at 343-44r. 
II. 
 The bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 157((b)(1) over this Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceeding.  The district court had appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) to review the bankruptcy court's 
turnover order.  This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 1291 to review the district court's 
affirmance of the turnover order.  See In re Moody, 817 F.2d 365 
9 
(5th Cir. 1987) (turnover order entered by the bankruptcy court 
in an adversary proceeding is a "final" order). 
 This court accepts the findings of fact of the 
bankruptcy court unless clearly erroneous.  The bankruptcy 
court's conclusions of law and the district court's decision are 
reviewed de novo.  See J.P. Fyfe, Inc. v. Bradco Supply Corp., 
891 F.2d 66, 69 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Muncrief, 900 F.2d 1220, 
1224 (8th Cir. 1990). 
III. 
 As an initial matter, the Bank contends that First 
Indemnity did not preserve the issue in the district and 
bankruptcy courts of whether Modular had breached its contract 
with The Salvation Army and that, therefore, First Indemnity has 
waived its arguments based upon any alleged breach of contract. 
We disagree.  First Indemnity's position consistently has been 
either that Modular defaulted on its obligations under the 
contract by failing to pay subcontractors and as a consequence 
was owed no money by the Salvation Army or alternatively that 
under New Jersey law those funds were held by the Salvation Army 
in constructive trust for the benefit of the subcontractors.  The 
breach of contract basis for argument was presented to the 
bankruptcy court in First Indemnity's February 21, 1992, letter 
brief in opposition to the Bank's motion for turnover:  "Thus, 
these contract monies never became part of the debtor's estate. 
The contractor defaulted and has therefore lost its right to 
these funds. . .."  App. at 205r.  First Indemnity repeated this 
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position at oral argument in its opposition to the turnover 
order.  App. at 182a.   
 First Indemnity then argued before the district court 
that: 
 There is no right of payment of 
retainage of the contract balance unless all 
of the subcontractors or suppliers have been 
paid in full.  Only in that manner can it be 
stated that all parties have complied with 
their contractual obligations.  A.I.A. 
contract forms, as used in the case herein, 
certify that all subcontractors and suppliers 
are paid in full before payment will be made 
from the owner. 
 
 In the case herein, it is quite clear 
that many of the subcontractors and suppliers 
were not paid. . .. 
App. at 294r.  Moreover, in its reply brief to the district 
court, First Indemnity asserted that because of this alleged 
breach of contract the Bank was precluded from attaching the 
funds held by the Salvation Army.  See app. at 204a-205a.  We 
find, therefore, that there has been no waiver of this issue. 
IV. 
 First Indemnity's primary argument on appeal is that, 
because Modular breached its contract with the Salvation Army, 
none of the funds held by the Salvation Army were owing to 
Modular and thus could not properly be considered part of the 
bankruptcy estate, subject to the Bank's lien and amenable to a 
turnover order.  Based upon the record before us, we agree with 
First Indemnity and will reverse the decisions of the district 
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and bankruptcy courts.3  We therefore hold, as a matter of law, 
that, assuming the facts are as the present record indicates, the 
funds held by the Salvation Army are not properly part of the 
estate in bankruptcy.4   
 The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an estate 
in bankruptcy.  This estate, pursuant to section 541(a)(1) of the 
Code, contains "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case."  11 U.S.C. 
§541(a)(1).  "'Although section 541 [of the Bankruptcy Code] 
defines property of the estate, we must look to state law to 
determine if a property right exists and to stake out its 
dimensions.'"  Universal Bonding Ins. Co. v. Gittens & Sprinkle 
Enter., Inc., 960 F.2d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting In re 
Nejberger, 934 F.2d 1300, 1302 (3d Cir. 1991)); see also Butner 
v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) ("Congress has generally 
left the determination of property rights in the assets of a 
bankrupt's estate to state law.").  We must look, therefore, to 
New Jersey law to determine whether the funds held by The 
                                                           
3Because we find that the funds held by the Salvation Army are 
not owing to Modular and thus not part of the bankruptcy estate, 
we find it unnecessary both to determine whether, under New 
Jersey law, the funds should be considered held in constructive 
trust for the benefit of subcontractors and to determine what 
priority First Indemnity would have were the funds at issue part 
of the bankruptcy estate and not held in constructive trust for 
the benefit of subcontractors. 
4As explained in Part V infra, we will remand to the bankruptcy 
court for a determination of whether any supplemental facts, not 
in the present record, would demonstrate that Modular had a legal 
or equitable interest in any part of the funds held by the 
Salvation Army. 
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Salvation Army are properly the "property" of the bankruptcy 
estate here. 
 The contract between Modular and the Salvation Army 
requires Modular to pay its subcontractors before final payment 
is due to Modular.  Moreover, it is undisputed, based upon the 
record currently available in this case, that Modular has failed 
to pay some of its subcontractors.  The question, then, is 
whether Modular is owed the funds retained by the Salvation Army. 
Under New Jersey law, "[a] contract right becomes an account as 
performance is made under the contract."  Continental Fin., Inc. 
v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 241 A.2d 853, 860 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1968), aff'd, 252 A.2d 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1969), aff'd, 265 A.2d 536 (N.J. 1970).  Thus, if the contract is 
not performed, nothing comes into existence upon which a lien 
could attach.  See Damato v. Leone Contr. Co., 25 A.2d 302 (N.J. 
Super. App. Div. 1956) (holding that a tax lien could not attach 
to the unpaid balance of a construction contract because of the 
contractor's failure substantially to perform his contract); see 
also United States v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Highways, 349 
F. Supp. 1370, 1381-82 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (where contractor's 
failure to pay subcontractors constituted a breach of its 
contract, the remaining contract funds were not due to the 
contractor and thus not part of the bankrupt estate); Atlantic 
Ref. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 183 F. Supp. 478, 482-83 
(W.D. Pa. 1960) (holding that "a failure by the contractor here 
to pay for labor and materials is just as much a failure to 
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perform and carry out the terms of the contract as an abandonment 
of the work would have been"). 
 In the present case, Modular did not fulfill its 
contractual obligation to pay all of its subcontractors.  First 
Indemnity, as surety for Modular, is required to pay any 
subcontractor not paid by Modular.  The funds held by the 
Salvation Army must be employed to satisfy these claims, either 
in direct payments to the subcontractors or in reimbursement to 
First Indemnity for the payments it has made as surety, standing 
in the Salvation Army's shoes, to the subcontractors.  If the 
Salvation Army were to be required to pay the monies it is 
holding into the bankruptcy estate, First Indemnity apparently 
would have to seek recovery for its payments to the 
subcontractors only as an unsecured creditor, in competition with 
the other unsecured creditors.  This is a result contemplated 
neither by the contract, as we have explained it, nor by New 
Jersey law.   
 New Jersey has recognized in cases of government 
contracts that payments held by the government, as owner of a 
construction project, did not become part of the bankrupt's 
estate.  This concept was first enunciated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 
(1962).  In Pearlman, a priority dispute arose between the 
trustee of the bankrupt estate and the surety with respect to 
contract funds retained by the United States, the owner of the 
construction project at issue.  The court held that the monies at 
issue had not become part of the bankrupt's estate; instead, the 
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retained funds remained the property of the owner, and by way of 
subrogation,5 became the surety's property to the extent 
necessary to reimburse it for its payment to laborers and 
materialmen.  See id. at 141.  The Court explained: 
Ownership of property rights before 
bankruptcy is one thing; priority of 
distribution in bankruptcy of property that 
has passed unencumbered into a bankrupt's 
estate is quite another.  Property interest 
in a fund not owned by a bankrupt at the time 
of adjudication whether complete or partial, 
legal or equitable, mortgages, liens or 
simple priority or right are, of course, not 
a part of the bankrupt's property and do not 
vest in the trustee.  The Bankruptcy Act 
simply does not authorize a trustee to 
distribute other people's property among a 
bankrupt's creditors. 
Id. at 135-36.  The Court then concluded: 
We therefore hold in accord with the 
established legal principles stated above 
that the government had a right to use the 
retained funds to pay laborers and 
materialmen; that the laborers and 
materialmen had a right to be paid out of the 
funds; that the contractor had he completed 
his job and paid his laborers and materialmen 
would have become entitled to the fund, and 
that the surety having paid the laborers and 
materialmen is entitled to the benefit of all 
these rights to the extent necessary to 
reimburse it. 
                                                           
5The subrogation scheme that is part of the Pearlman doctrine has 
been explained in National Shawmut Bank, see footnote 1, supra.  
See also Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 
317, 320 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968): 
 
The surety is not only a subrogee of the 
contractor, and therefore a creditor, but 
also a subrogee of the government [owner] and 
entitled to any rights the government has to 
the retained funds.  If the contractor fails 
to complete the job, the government can apply 
the retained funds and any remaining progress 
money to costs of completing the job. 
15 
Id. at 141;6 see also Polish v. Johnson Serv. Co., 333 F.2d 545 
(3d Cir. 1964) (following Pearlman); Framingham Trust Co. v. 
Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 427 F.2d 856, 859 (1st. Cir. 
1970) (explaining that "we cannot escape the conclusion that in 
both a practical and a legal sense, the payment of previously 
unpaid laborers and materialmen is a cost of completing the 
                                                           
6The adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 has not undercut 
Pearlman's vitality. 
 
In [Pearlman], the Supreme Court found that 
where by the doctrine of subrogation a surety 
becomes the virtual owner of property that 
would otherwise be the property of the 
debtor, the property will not become an asset 
of the estate.  Although the attempt of the 
Congress in enacting the Code was to give the 
broadest possible scope to what are assets of 
the estate, it is doubtful if that decision 
has been overruled. 
 
2 Daniel R. Cowans, Cowans Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 12.30 at 
587-88 (West 1989); accord J. Michael Franks & Michael E. Evans, 
A Defense of Established Landmarks:  Claims of Construction 
Sureties to Contract Funds Under Chapter 11, 25 Tort & Ins. L.J. 
28, ___ (1989): 
 
To the extent that a consensus developed, it 
became generally accepted that enactment of 
the Code would not weaken the principles of 
Pearlman.  The Pearlman decision itself 
characterized the surety's entitlement to 
benefits of subrogation in terms of a "firmly 
established rule," which was not to be 
"casually overruled."  Certainly, the Code's 
definition of a bankruptcy estate differs 
from the estate that was created by the 
former Bankruptcy Act and considered in 
Pearlman.  But, following the first wave of 
decisions under the Code with respect to 
sureties' rights, and through early 1985, it 
could be said rather confidently that 
Pearlman had weathered such assaults as the 
Code made available against it. 
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contract"); In re Pacific Marine Dredging and Construction, 79 
B.R. 924, 929 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987) (debtor's failure to pay for 
labor and materials was breach of public construction contract; 
consequently debtor had no legal or equitable interest in fund 
retained by owner and fund was not part of bankruptcy estate). 
 This concept of surety was recognized by the New Jersey 
Superior Court, Chancery Division in Stevlee Factors, Inc. v. 
State, 346 A.2d 624 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).  There the 
superior court, chancery division, broadly embraced and followed 
the subrogation rationale and doctrine enunciated in Pearlman, 
holding that "[s]ince the sureties stand in the place of those 
whose claims they have paid, the funds must be paid to the 
sureties just as the funds would have gone in the absence of a 
bond -- to the labor and materialmen rather than to the general 
creditors."  346 A.2d at 627.  The court also cited Jacobs v. 
Northeastern Corp., 206 A.2d 49, 54 (Pa. Super. 1965), which 
stated, "Payment of the retained balance became due and available 
only upon the performance by the sureties of Northeastern's 
obligation.  It is clear that all labor and materials claims must 
be fully discharged before there is entitlement to the full 
contract payment."  Stevlee Factors, 346 A.2d at 627-28.7   
                                                           
7Cf. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank of Marion County, 540 
S.2d 113 (Fla. 1989), where the court held that a surety's 
equitable subrogation rights had priority over a bank's perfected 
security interest.  The court stated: 
 
[T]he overwhelming and essentially unanimous 
post U.C.C. decisions in this country, 
federal as well as state courts, have held 
that (1) the surety's equitable right of 
subrogation is not a consensual security 
17 
 We find that the reasoning in Stevlee Factors 
represents an incorporation of Pearlman into New Jersey common 
law.  In the absence of contrary authority, we conclude that we 
must apply the Pearlman doctrine, which convinces us to find, 
based upon the record currently available in this case, that 
Modular's failure to pay its subcontractors was a breach of its 
contract such that it was not owed the funds held by the 
Salvation Army.   As a consequence, those funds did not become a 
part of the estate in bankruptcy. 
 Our conclusion is not undercut by this Court's decision 
in Universal Bonding Ins. Co. v. Gittens & Sprinkle, Entr., Inc., 
960 F.2d 366 (3d Cir. 1992), where we held that "monies owed but 
not yet paid to Gittens by state, municipal and federal agencies 
do not constitute statutory or equitable trusts in the hands of 
the government agencies and therefore may be collected by 
Gittens."  Id. at 367-68 (emphasis added).  In contrast to the 
situation in Gittens, in the present case, because of Modular's 
failure to pay its subcontractors, Modular was not "owed" the 
monies held by the Salvation Army.  Indeed, the court's rationale 
in Gittens is completely consistent with our holding here.  If 
the funds had been "owed" to Modular, they would have become 
"accounts" under New Jersey law, see Continental Finance, 241 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
interest, (2) no U.C.C. filing is necessary 
to perfect the surety's interest, and (3) the 
surety's interest continues to be, as it was 
under pre Code law, superior to the claim of 
a contract assignee. 
 
Id. at 116. 
18 
A.2d at 860.  Because, however, Modular had not paid all the 
subcontractors, under the terms of Modular's contract with the 
Salvation Army the funds were not owed to Modular.  If the 
subcontractors had been paid and the monies held by the Salvation 
Army were in fact owed to Modular, the Pearlman doctrine would 
not then be applicable. 
 Moreover, we find unpersuasive the bankruptcy and 
district courts' reasoning that the Pearlman doctrine applies 
only to public contracts with the government and not to private 
contracts.  There is no such limitation mentioned or implied by 
the court in Stevlee Factors.  While Stevlee Factors also 
involved a public contract, we find that it represents an 
encompassing approval of Pearlman without limitation only to 
public contracts.  See 346 A.2d at 626-28.  The basis cited by 
the New Jersey court for the adoption of the Pearlman doctrine is 
the equitable doctrine of subrogation which "has received wide 
application by the courts of this State and is referred to as a 
right highly favored in law."  Id. at 627 (citing Standard 
Accident Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 104 A.2d 288 (N.J. 1954); A.&B. 
Auto Stores of Jones St., Inc. v. Newark, 279 A.2d 693 (N.J. 
1971)). 
 Moreover, such a limitation of the equitable doctrine 
of subrogation only to public contracts would be illogical.  The 
equitable obligation of the owner to pay subcontractors from 
contract funds remaining in the owners hands is not confined to 
government projects, see e.g. Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. First 
National Bank & Trust Co., 531 P.2d 1370, 1376 (Okla. 1975) 
19 
(surety has priority over secured lender in dispute over 
remaining contract funds regardless of whether project is private 
or public).  The Supreme Court in Pearlman based its holding on 
common law principles of property rights and subrogation, not 
upon principles or rights arising from statutes governing public 
contracts.  See Pearlman, 371 U.S. at 139-40.  There is also 
nothing in the Court's reasoning in Pearlman that implies that 
its doctrine should apply only to public contracts.  The fact 
that the issue arose in a Miller Act case would appear to be 
fortuitous.  As explained by the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit in Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, 
Inc., 427 F.2d 856, 857-58 (1st Cir. 1970): 
The government's well established right to 
have the laborers and materialmen paid out of 
the unpaid progress payments or unpaid 
balance does not arise from any legal 
obligation to such suppliers but simply from 
its equitable obligation to those who provide 
it with labor and materials.  We see no 
reason why that same equitable obligation to 
the laborers and materialmen should not exist 
on the part of the non-government owner, who 
receives the same benefit from those 
suppliers -- construction work and materials 
-- as did the government in the 
aforementioned cases.  Moreover, the non-
government owner, like the government, has an 
interest in seeing its suppliers paid so that 
the work necessary for completion of the 
contract can be done with minimum disruption 
and expense. 
(citations and footnotes omitted). 
 We conclude that, based upon the record currently 
available in the present case, Modular breached its contractual 
obligation to pay its subcontractors and was therefore not "owed" 
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the monies held by the Salvation Army.  Under those 
circumstances, those funds are not properly considered part of 
the estate in bankruptcy and are not subject to the Bank's 
superpriority lien.  We will therefore reverse the bankruptcy 
court's turnover order. 
V. 
 With that said, we are uncomfortable with the 
development of the record in the present case.  Because of the 
bankruptcy court's conclusion that the funds held by the 
Salvation Army were part of the estate in bankruptcy, it did not 
find it necessary to hold a hearing to determine if any other 
factors might establish that any part of the funds were "owed" to 
Modular.  For example, the extent to which Modular failed to pay 
its subcontractors has never been documented adequately.  Nor did 
the bankruptcy court undertake to explore whether Modular had any 
other basis upon which to claim the funds being held by the 
Salvation Army.  We conclude that further proceedings may be 
necessary to determine if Modular has grounds to claim any of 
these funds.  We will, therefore, remand this case to the 
bankruptcy court to conduct such further proceedings it deems 
appropriate in light of the above. 
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VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of 
the district court and will remand this case to the district 
court with directions to remand it to the bankruptcy court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
